



Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                           O. Sury
Request for Comments: 9018                   Internet Systems Consortium
Updates: 7873                                                  W. Toorop
Category: Standards Track                                     NLnet Labs
ISSN: 2070-1721                                          D. Eastlake 3rd
                                                  Futurewei Technologies
                                                              M. Andrews
                                             Internet Systems Consortium
                                                              April 2021


         Interoperable Domain Name System (DNS) Server Cookies

Abstract

   DNS Cookies, as specified in RFC 7873, are a lightweight DNS
   transaction security mechanism that provide limited protection to DNS
   servers and clients against a variety of denial-of-service
   amplification, forgery, or cache-poisoning attacks by off-path
   attackers.

   This document updates RFC 7873 with precise directions for creating
   Server Cookies so that an anycast server set including diverse
   implementations will interoperate with standard clients, with
   suggestions for constructing Client Cookies in a privacy-preserving
   fashion, and with suggestions on how to update a Server Secret.  An
   IANA registry listing the methods and associated pseudorandom
   function suitable for creating DNS Server Cookies has been created
   with the method described in this document as the first and, as of
   the time of publication, only entry.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
     1.1.  Terminology and Definitions
   2.  Changes to RFC 7873
   3.  Constructing a Client Cookie
   4.  Constructing a Server Cookie
     4.1.  The Version Sub-Field
     4.2.  The Reserved Sub-Field
     4.3.  The Timestamp Sub-Field
     4.4.  The Hash Sub-Field
   5.  Updating the Server Secret
   6.  Cookie Algorithms
   7.  IANA Considerations
   8.  Security and Privacy Considerations
     8.1.  Client Cookie Construction
     8.2.  Server Cookie Construction
   9.  References
     9.1.  Normative References
     9.2.  Informative References
   Appendix A.  Test Vectors
     A.1.  Learning a New Server Cookie
     A.2.  The Same Client Learning a Renewed (Fresh) Server Cookie
     A.3.  Another Client Learning a Renewed Server Cookie
     A.4.  IPv6 Query with Rolled Over Secret
   Appendix B.  Implementation Status
   Acknowledgements
   Authors' Addresses

1.  Introduction

   DNS Cookies, as specified in [RFC7873], are a lightweight DNS
   transaction security mechanism that provide limited protection to DNS
   servers and clients against a variety of denial-of-service
   amplification, forgery, or cache-poisoning attacks by off-path
   attackers.  This document specifies a means of producing
   interoperable cookies so that an anycast server set including diverse
   implementations can be easily configured to interoperate with
   standard clients.  Also, single-implementation or non-anycast
   services can benefit from a well-studied standardized algorithm for
   which the behavioral and security characteristics are more widely
   known.

   The threats considered for DNS Cookies and the properties of the DNS
   Security features other than DNS Cookies are discussed in [RFC7873].

   In Section 6 of [RFC7873], for simplicity, it is "RECOMMENDED that
   the same Server Secret be used by each DNS server in a set of anycast
   servers."  However, how precisely a Server Cookie is calculated from
   this Server Secret is left to the implementation.

   This guidance has led to a gallimaufry of DNS Cookie implementations,
   calculating the Server Cookie in different ways.  As a result, DNS
   Cookies are impractical to deploy on multi-vendor anycast networks
   because even when all DNS Software shares the same secret, as
   RECOMMENDED in Section 6 of [RFC7873], the Server Cookie constructed
   by one implementation cannot generally be validated by another.

   There is no need for DNS client (resolver) Cookies to be
   interoperable across different implementations.  Each client need
   only be able to recognize its own cookies.  However, this document
   does contain recommendations for constructing Client Cookies in a
   client-protecting fashion.

1.1.  Terminology and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Note: "IP address" is used herein as a length-independent term
   covering both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.

2.  Changes to RFC 7873

   Appendices A.1 and B.1 of [RFC7873] provide example "simple"
   algorithms for computing Client and Server Cookies, respectively.
   These algorithms MUST NOT be used as the resulting cookies are too
   weak when evaluated against modern security standards.

   Appendix B.2 of [RFC7873] provides an example "more complex" server
   algorithm.  This algorithm is replaced by the interoperable
   specification in Section 4 of this document, which MUST be used by
   Server Cookie implementations.

   This document has suggestions on Client Cookie construction in
   Section 3.  The previous example in Appendix A.2 of [RFC7873] is NOT
   RECOMMENDED.

3.  Constructing a Client Cookie

   The Client Cookie acts as an identifier for a given client and its IP
   address and needs to be unguessable.  In order to provide minimal
   authentication of the targeted server, a client MUST use a different
   Client Cookie for each different Server IP address.  This complicates
   a server's ability to spoof answers for other DNS servers.  The
   Client Cookie SHOULD have 64 bits of entropy.

   When a server does not support DNS Cookies, the client MUST NOT send
   the same Client Cookie to that same server again.  Instead, it is
   recommended that the client does not send a Client Cookie to that
   server for a certain period (for example, five minutes) before it
   retries with a new Client Cookie.

   When a server does support DNS Cookies, the client should store the
   Client Cookie alongside the Server Cookie it registered for that
   server.

   Except for when the Client IP address changes, there is no need to
   change the Client Cookie often.  It is then reasonable to change the
   Client Cookie only if it has been compromised or after a relatively
   long implementation-defined period of time.  The time period should
   be no longer than a year, and in any case, Client Cookies are not
   expected to survive a program restart.

   Client-Cookie = 64 bits of entropy

   Previously, the recommended algorithm to compute the Client Cookie
   included the Client IP address as an input to a hashing function.
   However, when implementing the DNS Cookies, several DNS vendors found
   it impractical to include the Client IP as the Client Cookie is
   typically computed before the Client IP address is known.  Therefore,
   the requirement to put the Client IP address as input was removed.

   However, for privacy reasons, in order to prevent tracking of devices
   across links and to not circumvent IPv6 Privacy Extensions [RFC8981],
   clients MUST NOT reuse a Client or Server Cookie after the Client IP
   address has changed.

   One way to satisfy this requirement for non-reuse is to register the
   Client IP address alongside the Server Cookie when it receives the
   Server Cookie.  In subsequent queries to the server with that Server
   Cookie, the socket MUST be bound to the Client IP address that was
   also used (and registered) when it received the Server Cookie.
   Failure to bind MUST then result in a new Client Cookie.

4.  Constructing a Server Cookie

   The Server Cookie is effectively a Message Authentication Code (MAC).
   The Server Cookie, when it occurs in a COOKIE option in a request, is
   intended to weakly assure the server that the request came from a
   client that is both at the source IP address of the request and using
   the Client Cookie included in the option.  This assurance is provided
   by the Server Cookie that the server (or any other server from the
   anycast set) sent to that client in an earlier response and that
   appears as the Server Cookie field in the weakly authenticated
   request (see Section 5.2 of [RFC7873]).

   DNS Cookies do not provide protection against "on-path" adversaries
   (see Section 9 of [RFC7873]).  An on-path observer that has seen a
   Server Cookie for a client can abuse that Server Cookie to spoof
   request for that client within the time span a Server Cookie is valid
   (see Section 4.3).

   The Server Cookie is calculated from the Client Cookie, a series of
   Sub-Fields specified below, the Client IP address, and a Server
   Secret that is known only to the server or only to the set of servers
   at the same anycast address.

   For calculation of the Server Cookie, a pseudorandom function is
   RECOMMENDED with the property that an attacker that does not know the
   Server Secret, cannot find (any information about) the Server Secret,
   and cannot create a Server Cookie for any combination of the Client
   Cookie, the series of Sub-Fields specified below, and the client IP
   address, for which it has not seen a Server Cookie before.  Because
   DNS servers need to use the pseudorandom function in order to verify
   Server Cookies, it is RECOMMENDED that it be efficient to calculate.
   The pseudorandom function described in [SipHash-2-4] and introduced
   in Section 4.4 of this document fits these recommendations.

   Changing the Server Secret regularly is RECOMMENDED but, when a
   secure pseudorandom function is used, it need not be changed too
   frequently.  Once a month, for example, would be adequate.  See
   Section 5 on operator and implementation guidelines for updating a
   Server Secret.

   The 128-bit Server Cookie consists of the following Sub-Fields: a
   1-octet Version Sub-Field, a 3-octet Reserved Sub-Field, a 4-octet
   Timestamp Sub-Field, and an 8-octet Hash Sub-Field.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Version    |                   Reserved                    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           Timestamp                           |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                             Hash                              |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

4.1.  The Version Sub-Field

   The Version Sub-Field prescribes the structure and Hash calculation
   formula.  This document defines Version 1 to be the structure and way
   to calculate the Hash Sub-Field as defined in this section.

4.2.  The Reserved Sub-Field

   The value of the Reserved Sub-Field is reserved for future versions
   of server-side cookie construction.  On construction, it MUST be set
   to zero octets.  On Server Cookie verification, the server MUST NOT
   enforce those fields to be zero, and the Hash should be computed with
   the received value as described in Section 4.4.

4.3.  The Timestamp Sub-Field

   The Timestamp value prevents Replay Attacks and MUST be checked by
   the server to be within a defined period of time.  The DNS server
   SHOULD allow cookies within a 1-hour period in the past and a
   5-minute period into the future to allow operation of low-volume
   clients and some limited time skew between the DNS servers in the
   anycast set.

   The Timestamp value specifies a date and time in the form of a 32-bit
   *unsigned* number of seconds elapsed since 1 January 1970 00:00:00
   UTC, ignoring leap seconds, in network byte order.  All comparisons
   involving these fields MUST use "Serial number arithmetic", as
   defined in [RFC1982].  [RFC1982] specifies how the differences should
   be handled.  This handles any relative time window less than 68
   years, at any time in the future (2038, 2106, 2256, 22209, or later.)

   The DNS server SHOULD generate a new Server Cookie at least if the
   received Server Cookie from the client is more than half an hour old,
   but it MAY generate a new cookie more often than that.

4.4.  The Hash Sub-Field

   It's important that all the DNS servers use the same algorithm for
   computing the Server Cookie.  This document defines the Version 1 of
   the server-side algorithm to be:

   Hash = SipHash-2-4(
       Client Cookie | Version | Reserved | Timestamp | Client-IP,
       Server Secret )

   where "|" indicates concatenation.

   Notice that Client-IP is used for hash generation even though it is
   not included in the cookie value itself.  Client-IP can be either 4
   bytes for IPv4 or 16 bytes for IPv6.  The length of all the
   concatenated elements (the input into [SipHash-2-4]) MUST be either
   precisely 20 bytes in case of an IPv4 Client-IP or precisely 32 bytes
   in case of an IPv6 Client-IP.

   When a DNS server receives a Server Cookie version 1 for validation,
   the length of the received COOKIE option MUST be precisely 24 bytes:
   8 bytes for the Client Cookie plus 16 bytes for the Server Cookie.
   Verification of the length of the received COOKIE option is REQUIRED
   to guarantee the length of the input into [SipHash-2-4] to be
   precisely 20 bytes in the case of an IPv4 Client-IP and precisely 32
   bytes in the case of an IPv6 Client-IP.  This ensures that the input
   into [SipHash-2-4] is an injective function of the elements making up
   the input, and thereby prevents data substitution attacks.  More
   specifically, this prevents a 36-byte COOKIE option coming from an
   IPv4 Client-IP to be validated as if it were coming from an IPv6
   Client-IP.

   The Server Secret MUST be configurable to make sure that servers in
   an anycast network return consistent results.

5.  Updating the Server Secret

   Changing the Server Secret regularly is RECOMMENDED.  All servers in
   an anycast set must be able to verify the Server Cookies constructed
   by all other servers in that anycast set at all times.  Therefore, it
   is vital that the Server Secret is shared among all servers before it
   is used to generate Server Cookies on any server.

   Also, to maximize maintaining established relationships between
   clients and servers, an old Server Secret should be valid for
   verification purposes for a specific period.

   To facilitate this, deployment of a new Server Secret MUST be done in
   three stages:

   Stage 1
      The new Server Secret is deployed on all the servers in an anycast
      set by the operator.

      Each server learns the new Server Secret but keeps using the
      previous Server Secret to generate Server Cookies.

      Server Cookies constructed with both the new Server Secret and the
      previous Server Secret are considered valid when verifying.

      After stage 1 is completed, all the servers in the anycast set
      have learned the new Server Secret and can verify Server Cookies
      constructed with it, but keep generating Server Cookies with the
      old Server Secret.

   Stage 2
      This stage is initiated by the operator after the Server Cookie is
      present on all members in the anycast set.

      When entering Stage 2, servers start generating Server Cookies
      with the new Server Secret.  The previous Server Secret is not yet
      removed/forgotten.

      Server Cookies constructed with both the new Server Secret and the
      previous Server Secret are considered valid when verifying.

   Stage 3
      This stage is initiated by the operator when it can be assumed
      that most clients have obtained a Server Cookie derived from the
      new Server Secret.

      With this stage, the previous Server Secret can be removed and
      MUST NOT be used anymore for verifying.

      It is RECOMMENDED that the operator wait, after initiating Stage 2
      and before initiating Stage 3, at least a period of time equal to
      the longest TTL in the zones served by the server plus 1 hour.

      The operator SHOULD wait at least longer than the period clients
      are allowed to use the same Server Cookie, which SHOULD be 1 hour
      (see Section 4.3).

6.  Cookie Algorithms

   [SipHash-2-4] is a pseudorandom function suitable as a Message
   Authentication Code.  It is REQUIRED that a compliant DNS server use
   SipHash-2-4 as a mandatory and default algorithm for DNS Cookies to
   ensure interoperability between the DNS Implementations.

   The construction method and pseudorandom function used in calculating
   and verifying the Server Cookies are determined by the initial
   version byte and by the length of the Server Cookie.  Additional
   pseudorandom or construction algorithms for Server Cookies might be
   added in the future.

7.  IANA Considerations

   IANA has created a registry under the "Domain Name System (DNS)
   Parameters" heading as follows:

   Registry Name:  DNS Server Cookie Methods

   Assignment Policy:  Expert Review

   Reference:  [RFC9018], [RFC7873]

   Note:  A Server Cookie method (construction and pseudorandom
      algorithm) is determined by the Version in the first byte of the
      cookie and by the cookie size.  Server Cookie size is limited to
      the inclusive range of 8 to 32 bytes.

           +=========+=======+=================================+
           | Version |  Size | Method                          |
           +=========+=======+=================================+
           |       0 |  8-32 | Reserved                        |
           +---------+-------+---------------------------------+
           |       1 |  8-15 | Unassigned                      |
           +---------+-------+---------------------------------+
           |       1 |    16 | SipHash-2-4 [RFC9018] Section 4 |
           +---------+-------+---------------------------------+
           |       1 | 17-32 | Unassigned                      |
           +---------+-------+---------------------------------+
           |   2-239 |  8-32 | Unassigned                      |
           +---------+-------+---------------------------------+
           | 240-254 |  8-32 | Reserved for Private Use        |
           +---------+-------+---------------------------------+
           |     255 |  8-32 | Reserved                        |
           +---------+-------+---------------------------------+

                     Table 1: DNS Server Cookie Methods

8.  Security and Privacy Considerations

   DNS Cookies provide limited protection to DNS servers and clients
   against a variety of denial-of-service amplification, forgery, or
   cache-poisoning attacks by off-path attackers.  They provide no
   protection against on-path adversaries that can observe the plaintext
   DNS traffic.  An on-path adversary that can observe a Server Cookie
   for a client and server interaction can use that Server Cookie for
   denial-of-service amplification, forgery, or cache-poisoning attacks
   directed at that client for the lifetime of the Server Cookie.

8.1.  Client Cookie Construction

   In [RFC7873], it was RECOMMENDED to construct a Client Cookie by
   using a pseudorandom function of the Client IP address, the Server IP
   address, and a secret quantity known only to the client.  The Client
   IP address was included to ensure that a client could not be tracked
   if its IP address changes due to privacy mechanisms or otherwise.

   In this document, we changed Client Cookie construction to be just 64
   bits of entropy newly created for each new upstream server the client
   connects to.  As a consequence, additional care needs to be taken to
   prevent tracking of clients.  To prevent tracking, a new Client
   Cookie for a server MUST be created whenever the Client IP address
   changes.

   Unfortunately, tracking Client IP address changes is impractical with
   servers that do not support DNS Cookies.  To prevent tracking of
   clients with non-DNS Cookie-supporting servers, a client MUST NOT
   send a previously sent Client Cookie to a server not known to support
   DNS Cookies.  To prevent the creation of a new Client Cookie for each
   query to a non-DNS Cookie-supporting server, it is RECOMMENDED to not
   send a Client Cookie to that server for a certain period, for example
   five minutes.

   Summarizing:

   *  In order to provide minimal authentication, a client MUST use a
      different Client Cookie for each different Server IP address.

   *  To prevent tracking of clients, a new Client Cookie MUST be
      created when the Client IP address changes.

   *  To prevent tracking of clients by a non-DNS Cookie-supporting
      server, a client MUST NOT send a previously sent Client Cookie to
      a server in the absence of an associated Server Cookie.

   Note that it is infeasible for a client to detect a change in the
   public IP address when the client is behind a routing device
   performing Network Address Translation (NAT).  A server may track the
   public IP address of that routing device performing the NAT.
   Preventing tracking of the public IP of a NAT-performing routing
   device is beyond the scope of this document.

8.2.  Server Cookie Construction

   [RFC7873] did not give a precise recipe for constructing Server
   Cookies, but it did recommend usage of a pseudorandom function strong
   enough to prevent the guessing of cookies.  In this document,
   SipHash-2-4 is assigned as the pseudorandom function to be used for
   version 1 Server Cookies.  SipHash-2-4 is considered sufficiently
   strong for the immediate future, but predictions about future
   development in cryptography and cryptanalysis are beyond the scope of
   this document.

   The precise structure of version 1 Server Cookies is defined in this
   document.  A portion of the structure is made up of unhashed data
   elements that are exposed in cleartext to an on-path observer.  These
   unhashed data elements are taken along as input to the SipHash-2-4
   function of which the result is the other portion of the Server
   Cookie, so the unhashed portion of the Server Cookie cannot be
   changed by an on-path attacker without also recalculating the hashed
   portion for which the Server Secret needs to be known.

   One of the elements in the unhashed portion of version 1 Server
   Cookies is a Timestamp used to prevent Replay Attacks.  Servers
   verifying version 1 Server Cookies need to have access to a reliable
   time value, one that cannot be altered by an attacker, to compare
   with the Timestamp value.  Furthermore, all servers participating in
   an anycast set that validate version 1 Server Cookies need to have
   their clocks synchronized.

   For an on-path adversary observing a Server Cookie (as mentioned in
   the first paragraph of Section 8), the cleartext Timestamp data
   element reveals the lifetime during which the observed Server Cookie
   can be used to attack the client.

   In addition to the Security Considerations in this section, the
   Security Considerations section of [RFC7873] still applies.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1982]  Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1982, August 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1982>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3339]  Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
              Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.

   [RFC7873]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and M. Andrews, "Domain Name System (DNS)
              Cookies", RFC 7873, DOI 10.17487/RFC7873, May 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7873>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [SipHash-2-4]
              Aumasson, J. and D. J. Bernstein, "SipHash: A Fast Short-
              Input PRF", Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2012,
              Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 7668, December
              2012, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34931-7_28>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [RFC8981]  Gont, F., Krishnan, S., Narten, T., and R. Draves,
              "Temporary Address Extensions for Stateless Address
              Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 8981,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8981, February 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8981>.

Appendix A.  Test Vectors

A.1.  Learning a New Server Cookie

   A resolver (client) sending from IPv4 address 198.51.100.100 sends a
   query for "example.com" to an authoritative server listening on
   192.0.2.53 from which it has not yet learned the server cookie.

   The DNS requests and replies shown in this appendix are in a "dig"-
   like format.  The content of the DNS COOKIE Option is shown in
   hexadecimal format after "; COOKIE:".

   ;; Sending:
   ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 57406
   ;; flags:; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1

   ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
   ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
   ; COOKIE: 2464c4abcf10c957
   ;; QUESTION SECTION:
   ;example.com.                IN      A

   ;; QUERY SIZE: 52

   The authoritative nameserver (server) is configured with the
   following secret: e5e973e5a6b2a43f48e7dc849e37bfcf (as hex data).

   It receives the query on Wed Jun 5 10:53:05 UTC 2019.

   The content of the DNS COOKIE Option that the server will return is
   shown below in hexadecimal format after "; COOKIE:".

   The Timestamp field Section 4.3 in the returned Server Cookie has
   value 1559731985.  In the format described in [RFC3339], this is
   2019-06-05 10:53:05+00:00.

   ;; Got answer:
   ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 57406
   ;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1

   ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
   ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
   ; COOKIE: 2464c4abcf10c957010000005cf79f111f8130c3eee29480 (good)
   ;; QUESTION SECTION:
   ;example.com.                IN      A

   ;; ANSWER SECTION:
   example.com.         86400   IN      A       192.0.2.34

   ;; Query time: 6 msec
   ;; SERVER: 192.0.2.53#53(192.0.2.53)
   ;; WHEN: Wed Jun  5 10:53:05 UTC 2019
   ;; MSD SIZE  rcvd: 84

A.2.  The Same Client Learning a Renewed (Fresh) Server Cookie

   40 minutes later, the same resolver (client) queries the same server
   for "example.org".  It reuses the Server Cookie it learned in the
   previous query.

   The Timestamp field in that previously learned Server Cookie, which
   is now sent along in the request, was and is 1559731985.  In the
   format of [RFC3339], this is 2019-06-05 10:53:05+00:00.

   ;; Sending:
   ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 50939
   ;; flags:; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1

   ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
   ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
   ; COOKIE: 2464c4abcf10c957010000005cf79f111f8130c3eee29480
   ;; QUESTION SECTION:
   ;example.org.                IN      A

   ;; QUERY SIZE: 52

   The authoritative nameserver (server) now generates a new Server
   Cookie.  The server SHOULD do this because it can see the Server
   Cookie sent by the client is older than half an hour (Section 4.3),
   but it is also fine for a server to generate a new Server Cookie
   sooner or even for every answer.

   The Timestamp field in the returned new Server Cookie has value
   1559734385, which, in the format of [RFC3339], is 2019-06-05
   11:33:05+00:00.

   ;; Got answer:
   ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 50939
   ;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1

   ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
   ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
   ; COOKIE: 2464c4abcf10c957010000005cf7a871d4a564a1442aca77 (good)
   ;; QUESTION SECTION:
   ;example.org.                IN      A

   ;; ANSWER SECTION:
   example.org.         86400   IN      A       192.0.2.34

   ;; Query time: 6 msec
   ;; SERVER: 192.0.2.53#53(192.0.2.53)
   ;; WHEN: Wed Jun  5 11:33:05 UTC 2019
   ;; MSD SIZE  rcvd: 84

A.3.  Another Client Learning a Renewed Server Cookie

   Another resolver (client) with IPv4 address 203.0.113.203 sends a
   request to the same server with a valid Server Cookie that it learned
   before (on Wed Jun 5 09:46:25 UTC 2019).

   The Timestamp field of the Server Cookie in the request has value
   1559727985, which, in the format of [RFC3339], is 2019-06-05
   09:46:25+00:00.

   Note that the Server Cookie has Reserved bytes set but is still valid
   with the configured secret; the Hash part is calculated taking along
   the Reserved bytes.

   ;; Sending:
   ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 34736
   ;; flags:; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1

   ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
   ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
   ; COOKIE: fc93fc62807ddb8601abcdef5cf78f71a314227b6679ebf5
   ;; QUESTION SECTION:
   ;example.com.                IN      A

   ;; QUERY SIZE: 52

   The authoritative nameserver (server) replies with a freshly
   generated Server Cookie for this client conformant with this
   specification, i.e., with the Reserved bits set to zero.

   The Timestamp field in the returned new Server Cookie has value
   1559734700, which, in the format of [RFC3339], is 2019-06-05
   11:38:20+00:00.

   ;; Got answer:
   ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 34736
   ;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1

   ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
   ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
   ; COOKIE: fc93fc62807ddb86010000005cf7a9acf73a7810aca2381e (good)
   ;; QUESTION SECTION:
   ;example.com.                IN      A

   ;; ANSWER SECTION:
   example.com.         86400   IN      A       192.0.2.34

   ;; Query time: 6 msec
   ;; SERVER: 192.0.2.53#53(192.0.2.53)
   ;; WHEN: Wed Jun  5 11:38:20 UTC 2019
   ;; MSD SIZE  rcvd: 84

A.4.  IPv6 Query with Rolled Over Secret

   The query below is from a client with IPv6 address
   2001:db8:220:1:59de:d0f4:8769:82b8 to a server with IPv6 address
   2001:db8:8f::53.  The client has learned a valid Server Cookie before
   (on Wed Jun 5 13:36:57 UTC 2019) when the Server had the secret:
   dd3bdf9344b678b185a6f5cb60fca715.  The server now uses a new secret,
   but it can still validate the Server Cookie provided by the client as
   the old secret has not expired yet.

   The Timestamp field in the Server Cookie in the request has value
   1559741817, which, in the format of [RFC3339], is 2019-06-05
   13:36:57+00:00.

   ;; Sending:
   ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 6774
   ;; flags:; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1

   ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
   ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
   ; COOKIE: 22681ab97d52c298010000005cf7c57926556bd0934c72f8
   ;; QUESTION SECTION:
   ;example.net.                IN      A

   ;; QUERY SIZE: 52

   The authoritative nameserver (server) replies with a freshly
   generated server cookie for this client with its new secret:
   445536bcd2513298075a5d379663c962.

   The Timestamp field in the returned new Server Cookie has value
   1559741961, which, in the format of [RFC3339], is 2019-06-05
   13:39:21+00:00.

   ;; Got answer:
   ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 6774
   ;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1

   ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
   ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
   ; COOKIE: 22681ab97d52c298010000005cf7c609a6bb79d16625507a (good)
   ;; QUESTION SECTION:
   ;example.net.                IN      A

   ;; ANSWER SECTION:
   example.net.         86400   IN      A       192.0.2.34

   ;; Query time: 6 msec
   ;; SERVER: 2001:db8:8f::53#53(2001:db8:8f::53)
   ;; WHEN: Wed Jun  5 13:36:57 UTC 2019
   ;; MSD SIZE  rcvd: 84

Appendix B.  Implementation Status

   At the time of writing, BIND from version 9.16 and Knot DNS from
   version 2.9.0 create Server Cookies according to the recipe described
   in this document.  Unbound and NSD have a Proof-of-Concept
   implementation that has been tested for interoperability during the
   hackathon at IETF 104 in Prague.  Construction of privacy maintaining
   Client Cookies according to the directions in this document have been
   implemented in the getdns library and will be in the upcoming getdns-
   1.6.1 release and in Stubby version 0.3.1.

Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Witold Krecicki and Pieter Lexis for valuable input,
   suggestions, text, and above all for implementing a prototype of an
   interoperable DNS Cookie in Bind9, Knot, and PowerDNS during the
   hackathon at IETF 104 in Prague.  Thanks for valuable input and
   suggestions go to Ralph Dolmans, Bob Harold, Daniel Salzman, Martin
   Hoffmann, Mukund Sivaraman, Petr Spacek, Loganaden Velvindron, Bob
   Harold, Philip Homburg, Tim Wicinski, and Brian Dickson.

Authors' Addresses

   Ondrej Sury
   Internet Systems Consortium
   Czechia

   Email: ondrej@isc.org


   Willem Toorop
   NLnet Labs
   Science Park 400
   1098 XH Amsterdam
   Netherlands

   Email: willem@nlnetlabs.nl


   Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
   Futurewei Technologies
   2386 Panoramic Circle
   Apopka,  FL 32703
   United States of America

   Phone: +1-508-333-2270
   Email: d3e3e3@gmail.com


   Mark Andrews
   Internet Systems Consortium
   950 Charter Street
   Redwood City,  CA 94063
   United States of America

   Email: marka@isc.org
