RFC 9582: A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
Author: Job Snijders
Description: This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block. This document obsoletes RFC 6482.

RFC 9582 | Route Origin Authorization | May 2024
Snijders, et al. | Standards Track | [Page]

Stream:
  Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
RFC:
  9582
Obsoletes:
  6482
Category:
  Standards Track
Published:
  May 2024
ISSN:
  2070-1721
Authors:
  J. Snijders
  Fastly
  B. Maddison
  Workonline
  M. Lepinski
  Carleton College
  D. Kong
  Raytheon
  S. Kent
  Independent

# RFC 9582

# A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)

## Abstract

This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block. This document obsoletes RFC 6482.¶

## Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.¶

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.¶

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9582.¶

## Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶

## 1. Introduction

The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more information.) As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow entities to verify that an Autonomous System (AS) has been given permission by an IP address block holder to advertise routes to one or more prefixes within that block. A Route Origin Authorization (ROA) provides this function.¶

The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects [RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) wrapper [RFC5652] for the ROA content as well as a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. Therefore, to complete the specification of the ROA (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this document defines:¶

- The OID that identifies the signed object as being a ROA. (This OID appears within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo object.)¶
- The ASN.1 syntax for the ROA eContent. (This is the payload that specifies the AS being authorized to originate routes as well as the prefixes to which the AS may originate routes.) The ROA eContent is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690].¶
- Additional steps required to validate ROAs (in addition to the validation steps specified in [RFC6488]).¶

### 1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶

### 1.2. Changes from RFC 6482

This section summarizes the significant changes between [RFC6482] and the profile described in this document.¶

- Clarified the requirements for the IP address and AS identifier X.509 certificate extensions.¶
- Strengthened the ASN.1 formal notation and definitions.¶
- Incorporated errata for RFC 6482.¶
- Added an example ROA eContent payload, and a complete ROA (Appendix A).¶
- Specified a canonicalization procedure for the content of ipAddrBlocks.¶

## 2. Related Work

It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] and "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779].¶

Additionally, this document makes use of the RPKI signed object profile [RFC6488]; thus, familiarity with that document is assumed. Note that the RPKI signed object profile makes use of certificates adhering to the RPKI resource certificate profile [RFC6487]; thus, familiarity with that profile is also assumed.¶

## 3. The ROA Content Type

The content-type for a ROA is defined as id-ct-routeOriginAuthz and has the numerical value 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24.¶

This OID MUST appear within both the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object and the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]).¶

## 4. The ROA eContent

The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that has been authorized by the address space holder to originate routes and a list of one or more IP address prefixes that will be advertised. If the address space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS number. A ROA is formally defined as:¶

    RPKI-ROA-2023
      { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
      pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0)
      id-mod-rpkiROA-2023(75) }

    DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
    BEGIN

    IMPORTS
      CONTENT-TYPE
      FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
        { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
          pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;

    ct-routeOriginAttestation CONTENT-TYPE ::=
      { TYPE RouteOriginAttestation
        IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-routeOriginAuthz }

    id-ct-routeOriginAuthz OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
      { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
        pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) routeOriginAuthz(24) }

    RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
      version [0]   INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
      asID          ASID,
      ipAddrBlocks  SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }

    ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)

    ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
      addressFamily ADDRESS-FAMILY.&afi ({AddressFamilySet}),
      addresses     ADDRESS-FAMILY.&Addresses
                                   ({AddressFamilySet}{@addressFamily}) }

    ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= CLASS {
      &afi          OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)) UNIQUE,
      &Addresses
    } WITH SYNTAX { AFI &afi ADDRESSES &Addresses }

    AddressFamilySet ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
      { addressFamilyIPv4 | addressFamilyIPv6 }

    addressFamilyIPv4 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
      { AFI afi-IPv4 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv4 }
    addressFamilyIPv6 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
      { AFI afi-IPv6 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv6 }

    afi-IPv4 OCTET STRING ::= '0001'H
    afi-IPv6 OCTET STRING ::= '0002'H

    ROAAddressesIPv4 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv4}
    ROAAddressesIPv6 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv6}

    ub-IPv4 INTEGER ::= 32
    ub-IPv6 INTEGER ::= 128

    ROAIPAddress {INTEGER: ub} ::= SEQUENCE {
      address       BIT STRING (SIZE(0..ub)),
      maxLength     INTEGER (0..ub) OPTIONAL }

    END

¶

### 4.1. The version Element

The version number of the RouteOriginAttestation entry MUST be 0.¶

### 4.2. The asID Element

The asID element contains the AS number that is authorized to originate routes to the given IP address prefixes.¶

### 4.3. The ipAddrBlocks Element

The ipAddrBlocks element encodes the set of IP address prefixes to which the AS is authorized to originate routes. Note that the syntax here is more restrictive than that used in the IP address delegation extension defined in [RFC3779]. That extension can represent arbitrary address ranges, whereas ROAs need to represent only IP prefixes.¶

#### 4.3.1. Type ROAIPAddressFamily

Within the ROAIPAddressFamily structure, the addressFamily element contains the Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address family. This specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6; therefore, addressFamily MUST be either 0001 or 0002. IPv4 prefixes MUST NOT appear as IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (Section 2.5.5.2 of [RFC4291]).¶

There MUST be only one instance of ROAIPAddressFamily per unique AFI in the ROA. Thus, the ROAIPAddressFamily structure MUST NOT appear more than twice.¶

The addresses field contains IP prefixes as a sequence of type ROAIPAddress.¶

#### 4.3.2. Type ROAIPAddress

A ROAIPAddress structure is a sequence containing an address element of type BIT STRING and an optional maxLength element of type INTEGER.¶

##### 4.3.2.1. The address Element

The address element is of type BIT STRING and represents a single IP address prefix. This field uses the same representation of an IP address prefix as a BIT STRING as the IPAddress type defined in Section 2.2.3.8 of [RFC3779].¶

##### 4.3.2.2. The maxLength Element

When present, the maxLength element specifies the maximum length of the IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise. The maxLength element SHOULD NOT be encoded if the maximum length is equal to the prefix length. Certification Authorities SHOULD anticipate that future Relying Parties will become increasingly stringent in considering the presence of superfluous maxLength elements an encoding error.¶

If present, the maxLength element MUST be:¶

- an integer greater than or equal to the length of the accompanying prefix, and¶
- less than or equal to the maximum length (in bits) of an IP address in the applicable address family: 32 in the case of IPv4 and 128 in the case of IPv6.¶

For example, if the IP address prefix is 203.0.113.0/24 and maxLength is 26, the AS is authorized to advertise any more-specific prefix with a maximum length of 26. In this example, the AS would be authorized to advertise 203.0.113.0/24, 203.0.113.128/25, or 203.0.113.192/26, but not 203.0.113.0/27. See [RFC9319] for more information on the use of maxLength.¶

When the maxLength element is not present, the AS is only authorized to advertise the exact prefix specified in the ROAIPAddress structure's address element.¶

##### 4.3.2.3. Note on Overlapping or Superfluous Information Encoding

Note that a valid ROA may contain an IP address prefix (within a ROAIPAddress element) that is encompassed by another IP address prefix (within a separate ROAIPAddress element). For example, a ROA may contain the prefix 203.0.113.0/24 with maxLength 26, as well as the prefix 203.0.113.0/28 with maxLength 28. This ROA would authorize the indicated AS to advertise any prefix beginning with 203.0.113 with a minimum length of 24 and a maximum length of 26, as well as the specific prefix 203.0.113.0/28.¶

Additionally, a ROA MAY contain two ROAIPAddress elements, where the IP address prefix is identical in both cases. However, this is NOT RECOMMENDED, because in such a case, the ROAIPAddress element with the shorter maxLength grants no additional privileges to the indicated AS and thus can be omitted without changing the meaning of the ROA.¶

#### 4.3.3. Canonical Form for ipAddrBlocks

As the data structure described by the ROA ASN.1 module allows for many different ways to represent the same set of IP address information, a canonical form is defined such that every set of IP address information has a unique representation. In order to produce and verify this canonical form, the process described in this section SHOULD be used to ensure that information elements are unique with respect to one another and sorted in ascending order. Certification Authorities SHOULD anticipate that future Relying Parties will impose a strict requirement for the ipAddrBlocks field to be in this canonical form. This canonicalization procedure builds upon the canonicalization procedure specified in Section 2.2.3.6 of [RFC3779].¶

In order to semantically compare, sort, and deduplicate the contents of the ipAddrBlocks field, each ROAIPAddress element is mapped to an abstract data element composed of four integer values:¶

afi
  The AFI value appearing in the addressFamily field of the containing ROAIPAddressFamily as an integer.¶
addr
  The first IP address of the IP prefix appearing in the ROAIPAddress address field, as a 32-bit (IPv4) or 128-bit (IPv6) integer value.¶
plen
  The length of the IP prefix appearing in the ROAIPAddress address field as an integer value.¶
mlen
  The value appearing in the maxLength field of the ROAIPAddress element, if present; otherwise, the above prefix length value.¶

Thus, the equality or relative order of two ROAIPAddress elements can be tested by comparing their abstract representations.¶

##### 4.3.3.1. Comparator

The set of ipAddrBlocks is totally ordered. The order of two ipAddrBlocks is determined by the first non-equal comparison in the following list.¶

1. Data elements with a lower afi value precede data elements with a higher afi value.¶
2. Data elements with a lower addr value precede data elements with a higher addr value.¶
3. Data elements with a lower plen value precede data elements with a higher plen value.¶
4. Data elements with a lower mlen value precede data elements with a higher mlen value.¶

Data elements for which all four values compare equal are duplicates of one another.¶

##### 4.3.3.2. Example Implementations

- A sorting implementation [roasort-c] in ISO/IEC 9899:1999 ("ANSI C99").¶
- A sorting implementation [roasort-rs] in the Rust 2021 Edition.¶

## 5. ROA Validation

Before a Relying Party can use a ROA to validate a routing announcement, the Relying Party MUST first validate the ROA. To validate a ROA, the Relying Party MUST perform all the validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following additional ROA-specific validation steps:¶

- The IP address delegation extension [RFC3779] is present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ROA), and every IP address prefix in the ROA payload is contained within the set of IP addresses specified by the EE certificate's IP address delegation extension.¶
- The EE certificate's IP address delegation extension MUST NOT contain "inherit" elements as described in [RFC3779].¶
- The Autonomous System identifier delegation extension described in [RFC3779] is not used in ROAs and MUST NOT be present in the EE certificate.¶
- The ROA content fully conforms with all requirements specified in Sections 3 and 4.¶

If any of the above checks fail, the ROA in its entirety MUST be considered invalid and an error SHOULD be logged.¶

## 6. Security Considerations

There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA; it is anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication. Although the ROA is a signed, application-layer object, there is no intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA.¶

The purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to originate a route to the prefix or prefixes in the ROA. Thus, the integrity of a ROA MUST be established. This ROA specification makes use of the RPKI signed object format; thus, all security considerations discussed in [RFC6488] also apply to ROAs. Additionally, the signed object profile uses the CMS signed message format for integrity; thus, ROAs inherit all security considerations associated with that data structure.¶

The right of the ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate routes to the prefix or prefixes is established through the use of the address space and AS number PKI as described in [RFC6480]. Specifically, one MUST verify the signature on the ROA using an X.509 certificate issued under this PKI and check that the prefix or prefixes in the ROA are contained within those in the certificate's IP address delegation extension.¶

## 7. IANA Considerations

### 7.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)

IANA has updated the id-ct-routeOriginAuthz entry in the "SMI Security for S⁠/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows:¶

Table 1
Decimal | Description | References
--- | --- | ---
24 | id-ct-routeOriginAuthz | RFC 9582

### 7.2. RPKI Signed Objects Registry

IANA has updated the Route Origination Authorization entry in the "RPKI Signed Objects" registry created by [RFC6488] as follows:¶

Table 2
Name | OID | Reference
--- | --- | ---
Route Origination Authorization | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24 | RFC 9582

### 7.3. File Extension

IANA has updated the entry for the ROA file extension in the "RPKI Repository Name Schemes" registry created by [RFC6481] as follows:¶

Table 3
Filename Extension | RPKI Object | Reference
--- | --- | ---
.roa | Route Origination Authorization | RFC 9582

### 7.4. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)

IANA has allocated the following entry in the "SMI Security for S⁠/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry:¶

Table 4
Decimal | Description | References
--- | --- | ---
75 | id-mod-rpkiROA-2023 | RFC 9582

### 7.5. Media Type

IANA has updated the media type application/rpki-roa in the "Media Types" registry as follows:¶

Type name:
  application¶
Subtype name:
  rpki-roa¶
Required parameters:
  N/A¶
Optional parameters:
  N/A¶
Encoding considerations:
  binary¶
Security considerations:
  Carries an RPKI ROA (RFC 9582). This media type contains no active content. See Section 6 of RFC 9582 for further information.¶
Interoperability considerations:
  None¶
Published specification:
  RFC 9582¶
Applications that use this media type:
  RPKI operators¶
Additional information:

  Content:
    This media type is a signed object, as defined in [RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of prefixes and an AS identifier as defined in RFC 9582.¶
  Magic number(s):
    None¶
  File extension(s):
    .roa¶
  Macintosh file type code(s):
    None¶
Person & email address to contact for further information:
  Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>¶
Intended usage:
  COMMON¶
Restrictions on usage:
  None¶
Change controller:
  IETF¶

## 8. References

### 8.1. Normative References

[RFC2119]
  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3779]
  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC4291]
  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>.
[RFC5652]
  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6268]
  Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268, DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268>.
[RFC6481]
  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6482]
  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6487]
  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[RFC6488]
  Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.
[RFC8174]
  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[X.690]
  ITU-T, "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, February 2021.

### 8.2. Informative References

[RFC4648]
  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5280]
  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6480]
  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC9319]
  Gilad, Y., Goldberg, S., Sriram, K., Snijders, J., and B. Maddison, "The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185, RFC 9319, DOI 10.17487/RFC9319, October 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9319>.
[roasort-c]
  Snijders, J., "ROA sorter in C", commit 68969ea, July 2023, <https://github.com/job/roasort>.
[roasort-rs]
  Maddison, B., "ROA sorter in Rust", commit 023e756, August 2023, <https://github.com/benmaddison/roasort>.

## Appendix A. Example ROA eContent Payload

An example of a DER-encoded ROA eContent is provided below, with annotation following the "#" character.¶

    $ echo 16i 301802030100003011300F040200023009300703050020010DB8 P \
      | dc | openssl asn1parse -inform DER -i -dump
     0:d=0  hl=2 l=  24 cons: SEQUENCE           # RouteOriginAttestation
     2:d=1  hl=2 l=   3 prim:  INTEGER  :010000  #  asID 65536
     7:d=1  hl=2 l=  17 cons:  SEQUENCE          #  ipAddrBlocks
     9:d=2  hl=2 l=  15 cons:   SEQUENCE         #   ROAIPAddressFamily
    11:d=3  hl=2 l=   2 prim:    OCTET STRING    #    addressFamily
       0000 - 00 02                              #     IPv6
    15:d=3  hl=2 l=   9 cons:    SEQUENCE        #    addresses
    17:d=4  hl=2 l=   7 cons:     SEQUENCE       #     ROAIPAddress
    19:d=5  hl=2 l=   5 prim:      BIT STRING    #      2001:db8::/32
        0000 - 00 20 01 0d b8

¶

Below is a complete RPKI ROA signed object, Base64 encoded per [RFC4648].¶

    MIIGgAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGcTCCBm0CAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwKwYLKoZI
    hvcNAQkQARigHAQaMBgCAwEAADARMA8EAgACMAkwBwMFACABDbigggR8MIIEeDCC
    A2CgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAvMS0wKwYDVQQDEyQ4NjUyNWNkNS00
    NGQ3LTRkZjktODA3OS00YTlkY2RmMjY5NDQwHhcNMjQwNTAxMDAzNDEzWhcNMjUw
    NTAxMDAzNDEzWjAvMS0wKwYDVQQDEyRlYjg3NmJmMC1lYTlkLTRiMjItYTExZS0y
    YmNhZDA4MzliMTMwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCsPSYD
    JnGOFRSHUZuVxibx2TQfWWoPIHNKgQAwYn1Kz88HaGgVf63G1mJd/cxBNMj5AfNQ
    m2zKSAb83UAp97DUXf+lvoKj4F+lxCCjFaBpBeehc7X0XPDpbcbqo1YrzIzxxqou
    GijEwZ4k+BaM2avEFYMBszqWA+ZdneBSuZ3YbHPKp2royn4pJ9a1I5fYdqFQi0eo
    VZbAc8pZmwRVOuedYYqQiy9CSRGsbiGlB0fKt2m/zSsuvl4Zit7+NyGL3wAZecjZ
    XEInsTtQsjQuy5PeJjLDyfWi/ZFi0qPsNlK0M2lMsi5B7QKaagA1RbRVHZyrkWoe
    20l5rfk1bIGMv/plAgMBAAGjggGdMIIBmTAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwHQYDVR0O
    BBYEFN4UWxk/syCyWnRDVSmMi/fCUj0iMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFNZyCOpHDp1t1mVA
    IvVTrcE4mrQ0MBgGA1UdIAEB/wQOMAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHDgIwWgYIKwYBBQUHAQEE
    TjBMMEoGCCsGAQUFBzAChj5yc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwby8x
    bklJNmtjT25XM1daVUFpOVZPdHdUaWF0RFNnLmNlcjBRBgNVHR8ESjBIMEagRKBC
    hkByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwby9BLzFuSUk2a2NPblczV1pV
    QWk5Vk90d1RpYXREU2cuY3JsMFwGCCsGAQUFBwELBFAwTjBMBggrBgEFBQcwC4ZA
    cnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG8vQS8zaFJiR1QteklMSmFkRU5W
    S1l5TDk4SlNQU0tnLnJvYTAgBggrBgEFBQcBBwEB/wQRMA8wDQQCAAIwBwMFACAB
    DbgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAKFoMax1Gdxb9mvSfKE2Jo+DudqCGjWF3mGv
    rkhag8CQYi2CBJZLrkpCRha8doBW4PbrL36waWG55A/TdLKvWzAf66/v3iL5QcXo
    Krb0+fp1pu/YVK4xFxwYJhbX4OnL4Gqh9+t4fFXhEDj2QemlgjWZyxvgx2Sra/iK
    fOt6gxUhie3oIT+FiYjqF//WIUBP/HjTf+E4IRGN8tCr3NDhMZG6c0njq2keW7w4
    wnw1+GqSyDhqu0Rsr0m3XUbivkc+h0ZZBBS9SxPM+GfgdzEDV51VcK1SeMa3G3Ca
    j0cJA99eTM+j52tkNVupftv1Y+4Wt0XGLKmRNKw26XDaphzw3B8xggGqMIIBpgIB
    A4AU3hRbGT+zILJadENVKYyL98JSPSIwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGswGgYJKoZIhvcN
    AQkDMQ0GCyqGSIb3DQEJEAEYMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yNDA1MDEwMDM0MTNa
    MC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCBlz4HExs5A69pxkJqTCbUvc2iTS7C4eDd3aJD4hYJS
    wjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQBa2wmuDHbcvfnMRIaOJ6m30zpCZtJVBLDELoA0
    2kLb18TfFbxQhUi/jZ9g0hNYksV0n4vOJnCQ3qP6IIfm0ZsKzRnyzZf3f2xegw2p
    Wzi9Z8QYlc//eY3+XA3bQ37h+s0r7OZkQH7+KmIwDOCYaLh/YB37wp/7giC7bpvi
    c2Fv2illQmctrK7tYDHsNGq+svULTjemUaklqfcRAAJnQTRzTz8So9wKY9SR2VVZ
    68DDItTBUx8jPYeNQtvxxoVA6HuW9wyurlYQ9m/cF8CzlizVmsHgxzjO9ifmYJj9
    YZWMLtjF7Xw1fQZLYMrD5DCZzUw3nv4GyyHxckm2kLF38mze

¶

The object in this appendix has the following properties:¶

    Object size: 1668 octets
    Object SHA256 message digest:
         3a39e0b652e79ddf6efdd178ad5e3b29e0121b1e593b89f1e0ac18f3ba60d5e7

    CMS signing time: Wed 01 May 2024 00:34:13 +0000

    X.509 end-entity certificate
    Subject key id: DE145B193FB320B25A744355298C8BF7C2523D22
    Authority key id: D67208EA470E9D6DD6654022F553ADC1389AB434
    Issuer: CN=86525cd5-44d7-4df9-8079-4a9dcdf26944
    Serial: 3
    Not before: Wed 01 May 2024 00:34:13 +0000
    Not after: Thu 01 May 2025 00:34:13 +0000
    IP address delegation: 2001:db8::/32

    ROA eContent
    asID: 65536
    addresses: 2001:db8::/32

¶

## Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Theo Buehler, Ties de Kock, Martin Hoffmann, Charles Gardiner, Russ Housley, Jeffrey Haas, Bob Beck, and Tom Harrison for their help and contributions. Additionally, the authors thank Jim Fenton, Vijay Gurbani, Haoyu Song, Rob Austein, Roque Gagliano, Danny McPherson, Sam Weiler, Jasdip Singh, and Murray S. Kucherawy for their careful reviews and helpful comments.¶

## Authors' Addresses