<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" version="3" category="std" docName="draft-ietf-sidrops-rfc6482bis-09" number="9582" ipr="trust200902" xml:lang="en" sortRefs="true" submissionType="IETF" consensus="true" updates="" obsoletes="6482" symRefs="true" tocInclude="true" prepTime="2024-05-23T12:41:41" indexInclude="true" scripts="Common,Latin" tocDepth="3">
  <link href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-rfc6482bis-09" rel="prev"/>
  <link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc9582" rel="alternate"/>
  <link href="urn:issn:2070-1721" rel="alternate"/>
  <front>
    <title abbrev="Route Origin Authorization">A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)</title>
    <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9582" stream="IETF"/>
    <author fullname="Job Snijders" initials="J." surname="Snijders">
      <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Fastly</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <postalLine>Amsterdam</postalLine>
          <postalLine>The Netherlands</postalLine>
        </postal>
        <email>job@fastly.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Ben Maddison" initials="B" surname="Maddison">
      <organization abbrev="Workonline" showOnFrontPage="true">Workonline</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street/>
          <city>Cape Town</city>
          <country>South Africa</country>
        </postal>
        <email>benm@workonline.africa</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Matthew Lepinski" initials="M." surname="Lepinski">
      <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Carleton College</organization>
      <address>
        <email>mlepinski@carleton.edu</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Derrick Kong" initials="D." surname="Kong">
      <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Raytheon</organization>
      <address>
        <email>derrick.kong@raytheon.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Stephen Kent" initials="S." surname="Kent">
      <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Independent</organization>
      <address>
        <email>kent@alum.mit.edu</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date month="05" year="2024"/>
    <area>Operations and Management Area (OPS)</area>
    <workgroup>sidrops</workgroup>
    <keyword>RPKI</keyword>
    <keyword>Routing Security</keyword>
    <keyword>BGP</keyword>
    <abstract pn="section-abstract">
      <t indent="0" pn="section-abstract-1">
         This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs).
         A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block.
         This document obsoletes RFC 6482.
      </t>
    </abstract>
    <boilerplate>
      <section anchor="status-of-memo" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-boilerplate.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-status-of-this-memo">Status of This Memo</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-1">
            This is an Internet Standards Track document.
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-2">
            This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
            (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
            received public review and has been approved for publication by
            the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further
            information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of 
            RFC 7841.
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-3">
            Information about the current status of this document, any
            errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
            <eref target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9582" brackets="none"/>.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="copyright" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-boilerplate.2">
        <name slugifiedName="name-copyright-notice">Copyright Notice</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.2-1">
            Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
            document authors. All rights reserved.
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.2-2">
            This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
            Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
            (<eref target="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info" brackets="none"/>) in effect on the date of
            publication of this document. Please review these documents
            carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with
            respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this
            document must include Revised BSD License text as described in
            Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without
            warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
        </t>
      </section>
    </boilerplate>
    <toc>
      <section anchor="toc" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-toc.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-table-of-contents">Table of Contents</name>
        <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1">
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.1">
            <t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.1"><xref derivedContent="1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-introduction">Introduction</xref></t>
            <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2">
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2.1">
                <t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="1.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-1.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-requirements-language">Requirements Language</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2.2">
                <t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="1.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-1.2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-changes-from-rfc-6482">Changes from RFC 6482</xref></t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.2">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.2.1"><xref derivedContent="2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-related-work">Related Work</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.3">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.3.1"><xref derivedContent="3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-3"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-the-roa-content-type">The ROA Content Type</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.4">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.1"><xref derivedContent="4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-the-roa-econtent">The ROA eContent</xref></t>
            <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2">
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.1">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="4.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-the-version-element">The version Element</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.2">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="4.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4.2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-the-asid-element">The asID Element</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="4.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4.3"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-the-ipaddrblocks-element">The ipAddrBlocks Element</xref></t>
                <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3.2">
                  <li pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3.2.1">
                    <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="4.3.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4.3.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-type-roaipaddressfamily">Type ROAIPAddressFamily</xref></t>
                  </li>
                  <li pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3.2.2">
                    <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="4.3.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4.3.2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-type-roaipaddress">Type ROAIPAddress</xref></t>
                  </li>
                  <li pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3.2.3">
                    <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="4.3.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4.3.3"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-canonical-form-for-ipaddrbl">Canonical Form for ipAddrBlocks</xref></t>
                  </li>
                </ul>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.5">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.1"><xref derivedContent="5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-5"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-roa-validation">ROA Validation</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.1"><xref derivedContent="6" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-security-considerations">Security Considerations</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.7">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.1"><xref derivedContent="7" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-iana-considerations">IANA Considerations</xref></t>
            <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2">
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="7.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-smi-security-for-s-mime-cms">SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.2">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="7.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-rpki-signed-objects-registr">RPKI Signed Objects Registry</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.3">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="7.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.3"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-file-extension">File Extension</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.4">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent="7.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.4"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-smi-security-for-s-mime-mod">SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.1"><xref derivedContent="7.5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.5"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-media-type">Media Type</xref></t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.8">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.1"><xref derivedContent="8" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-8"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-references">References</xref></t>
            <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2">
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="8.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-8.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-normative-references">Normative References</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.2">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="8.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-8.2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-informative-references">Informative References</xref></t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.1"><xref derivedContent="Appendix A" format="default" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.a"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-example-roa-econtent-payloa">Example ROA eContent Payload</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.10">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.10.1"><xref derivedContent="" format="none" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.b"/><xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acknowledgements">Acknowledgements</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.11">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.11.1"><xref derivedContent="" format="none" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.c"/><xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-authors-addresses">Authors' Addresses</xref></t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </toc>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <section anchor="intro" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-1">
      <name slugifiedName="name-introduction">Introduction</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-1-1">
        The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to improve routing security.
        (See <xref target="RFC6480" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6480"/> for more information.)
        As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow entities to verify that an Autonomous System (AS) has been given permission by an IP address block holder to advertise routes to one or more prefixes within that block.
        A Route Origin Authorization (ROA) provides this function.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-1-2">
        The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects <xref target="RFC6488" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6488"/>, which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) wrapper <xref target="RFC5652" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5652"/> for the ROA content as well as a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed objects.
        Therefore, to complete the specification of the ROA (see <xref target="RFC6488" section="4" sectionFormat="of" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6488#section-4" derivedContent="RFC6488"/>), this document defines:
      </t>
      <ul bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" spacing="normal" pn="section-1-3">
        <li pn="section-1-3.1">
          The OID that identifies the signed object as being a ROA.
          (This OID appears within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo object.)
        </li>
        <li pn="section-1-3.2">
          The ASN.1 syntax for the ROA eContent.
          (This is the payload that specifies the AS being authorized to originate routes as well as the prefixes to which the AS may originate routes.)
          The ROA eContent is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) <xref target="X.690" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="X.690"/>.
        </li>
        <li pn="section-1-3.3">
          Additional steps required to validate ROAs (in addition to the validation steps specified in <xref target="RFC6488" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6488"/>).
        </li>
      </ul>
      <section anchor="reqs-lang" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-1.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-requirements-language">Requirements Language</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-1.1-1">The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>",
       "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>",
       "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>",
       "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>",
       "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
       "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document
       are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14
       <xref target="RFC2119" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8174"/> when, and only
       when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="Changes" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-1.2">
        <name slugifiedName="name-changes-from-rfc-6482">Changes from RFC 6482</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-1.2-1">
          This section summarizes the significant changes between <xref target="RFC6482" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6482"/> and the profile described in this document.
        </t>
        <ul bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" spacing="normal" pn="section-1.2-2">
          <li pn="section-1.2-2.1">Clarified the requirements for the IP address and AS identifier X.509 certificate extensions.</li>
          <li pn="section-1.2-2.2">Strengthened the ASN.1 formal notation and definitions.</li>
          <li pn="section-1.2-2.3">Incorporated errata for RFC 6482.</li>
          <li pn="section-1.2-2.4">Added an example ROA eContent payload, and a complete ROA (Appendix A).</li>
          <li pn="section-1.2-2.5">Specified a canonicalization procedure for the content of ipAddrBlocks.</li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="Related" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-2">
      <name slugifiedName="name-related-work">Related Work</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-2-1">
        It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts described in "<xref target="RFC5280" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"/>" <xref target="RFC5280" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5280"/> and "<xref target="RFC3779" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers"/>" <xref target="RFC3779" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3779"/>.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-2-2">
        Additionally, this document makes use of the RPKI signed object profile <xref target="RFC6488" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6488"/>; thus, familiarity with that document is assumed.
        Note that the RPKI signed object profile makes use of certificates adhering to the RPKI resource certificate profile <xref target="RFC6487" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6487"/>; thus, familiarity with that profile is also assumed.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="content" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-3">
      <name slugifiedName="name-the-roa-content-type">The ROA Content Type</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-1">
        The content-type for a ROA is defined as id-ct-routeOriginAuthz and has the numerical value 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-2">
        This OID <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> appear within both the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object and the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo object (see <xref target="RFC6488" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6488"/>).
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="econtent" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-4">
      <name slugifiedName="name-the-roa-econtent">The ROA eContent</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-4-1">
        The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that has been authorized by the address space holder to originate routes and a list of one or more IP address prefixes that will be advertised.
        If the address space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS number.
        A ROA is formally defined as:
      </t>
      <sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="false" pn="section-4-2">
RPKI-ROA-2023
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
  pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0)
  id-mod-rpkiROA-2023(75) }

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

IMPORTS
  CONTENT-TYPE
  FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
    { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
      pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;

ct-routeOriginAttestation CONTENT-TYPE ::=
  { TYPE RouteOriginAttestation
    IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-routeOriginAuthz }

id-ct-routeOriginAuthz OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
    pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) routeOriginAuthz(24) }

RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
  version [0]   INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
  asID          ASID,
  ipAddrBlocks  SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }

ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)

ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
  addressFamily ADDRESS-FAMILY.&amp;afi ({AddressFamilySet}),
  addresses     ADDRESS-FAMILY.&amp;Addresses
                               ({AddressFamilySet}{@addressFamily}) }

ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= CLASS {
  &amp;afi          OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)) UNIQUE,
  &amp;Addresses
} WITH SYNTAX { AFI &amp;afi ADDRESSES &amp;Addresses }

AddressFamilySet ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
  { addressFamilyIPv4 | addressFamilyIPv6 }

addressFamilyIPv4 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
  { AFI afi-IPv4 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv4 }
addressFamilyIPv6 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
  { AFI afi-IPv6 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv6 }

afi-IPv4 OCTET STRING ::= '0001'H
afi-IPv6 OCTET STRING ::= '0002'H

ROAAddressesIPv4 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv4}
ROAAddressesIPv6 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv6}

ub-IPv4 INTEGER ::= 32
ub-IPv6 INTEGER ::= 128

ROAIPAddress {INTEGER: ub} ::= SEQUENCE {
  address       BIT STRING (SIZE(0..ub)),
  maxLength     INTEGER (0..ub) OPTIONAL }

END
</sourcecode>
      <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-4.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-the-version-element">The version Element</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-4.1-1">
          The version number of the RouteOriginAttestation entry <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be 0.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-4.2">
        <name slugifiedName="name-the-asid-element">The asID Element</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-4.2-1">
          The asID element contains the AS number that is authorized to originate routes to the given IP address prefixes.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-4.3">
        <name slugifiedName="name-the-ipaddrblocks-element">The ipAddrBlocks Element</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3-1">
          The ipAddrBlocks element encodes the set of IP address prefixes to which the AS is authorized to originate routes.
          Note that the syntax here is more restrictive than that used in the IP address delegation extension defined in <xref target="RFC3779" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3779"/>.
          That extension can represent arbitrary address ranges, whereas ROAs need to represent only IP prefixes.
        </t>
        <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-4.3.1">
          <name slugifiedName="name-type-roaipaddressfamily">Type ROAIPAddressFamily</name>
          <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3.1-1">
            Within the ROAIPAddressFamily structure, the addressFamily element contains the Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address family.
            This specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6; therefore, addressFamily <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be either 0001 or 0002.
            IPv4 prefixes <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> appear as IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (<xref target="RFC4291" section="2.5.5.2" sectionFormat="of" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4291#section-2.5.5.2" derivedContent="RFC4291"/>).
          </t>
          <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3.1-2">
            There <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be only one instance of ROAIPAddressFamily per unique AFI in the ROA.
            Thus, the ROAIPAddressFamily structure <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> appear more than twice.
          </t>
          <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3.1-3">
            The addresses field contains IP prefixes as a sequence of type ROAIPAddress.
          </t>
        </section>
        <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-4.3.2">
          <name slugifiedName="name-type-roaipaddress">Type ROAIPAddress</name>
          <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3.2-1">
            A ROAIPAddress structure is a sequence containing an address element of type BIT STRING and an optional maxLength element of type INTEGER.
          </t>
          <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-4.3.2.1">
            <name slugifiedName="name-the-address-element">The address Element</name>
            <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3.2.1-1">
              The address element is of type BIT STRING and represents a single IP address prefix. This field uses the same representation of an IP address prefix as a
BIT STRING as the IPAddress type defined in <xref target="RFC3779" sectionFormat="of" section="2.2.3.8" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3779#section-2.2.3.8" derivedContent="RFC3779"/>.
            </t>
          </section>
          <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-4.3.2.2">
            <name slugifiedName="name-the-maxlength-element">The maxLength Element</name>
            <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3.2.2-1">
              When present, the maxLength element specifies the maximum length of the IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise.
              The maxLength element <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> be encoded if the maximum length is equal to the prefix length.
              Certification Authorities <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> anticipate that future Relying Parties will become increasingly stringent in considering the presence of superfluous maxLength elements an encoding error.
            </t>
            <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3.2.2-2">
              If present, the maxLength element <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be:
            </t>
            <ul bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" spacing="normal" pn="section-4.3.2.2-3">
              <li pn="section-4.3.2.2-3.1">an integer greater than or equal to the length of the accompanying prefix, and</li>
              <li pn="section-4.3.2.2-3.2">less than or equal to the maximum length (in bits) of an IP address in the applicable address family: 32 in the case of IPv4 and 128 in the case of IPv6.</li>
            </ul>
            <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3.2.2-4">
              For example, if the IP address prefix is 203.0.113.0/24 and maxLength is 26, the AS is authorized to advertise any more-specific prefix with a maximum length of 26.
              In this example, the AS would be authorized to advertise 203.0.113.0/24, 203.0.113.128/25, or 203.0.113.192/26, but not 203.0.113.0/27.
              See <xref target="RFC9319" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC9319"/> for more information on the use of maxLength.
            </t>
            <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3.2.2-5">
              When the maxLength element is not present, the AS is only authorized to advertise the exact prefix specified in the ROAIPAddress structure's address element.
            </t>
          </section>
          <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-4.3.2.3">
            <name slugifiedName="name-note-on-overlapping-or-supe">Note on Overlapping or Superfluous Information Encoding</name>
            <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3.2.3-1">
                Note that a valid ROA may contain an IP address prefix (within a ROAIPAddress element) that is encompassed by another IP address prefix (within a separate ROAIPAddress element).
                For example, a ROA may contain the prefix 203.0.113.0/24 with maxLength 26, as well as the prefix 203.0.113.0/28 with maxLength 28.
                This ROA would authorize the indicated AS to advertise any prefix beginning with 203.0.113 with a minimum length of 24 and a maximum length of 26, as well as the specific prefix 203.0.113.0/28.
            </t>
            <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3.2.3-2">
                Additionally, a ROA <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> contain two ROAIPAddress elements, where the IP address prefix is identical in both cases.
                However, this is <bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>, because in such a case, the ROAIPAddress element with the shorter maxLength grants no additional privileges to the indicated AS and thus can be omitted without changing the meaning of the ROA.
            </t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-4.3.3">
          <name slugifiedName="name-canonical-form-for-ipaddrbl">Canonical Form for ipAddrBlocks</name>
          <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3.3-1">
              As the data structure described by the ROA ASN.1 module allows for many different ways to represent the same set of IP address information, a canonical form is defined such that every set of IP address information has a unique representation.
              In order to produce and verify this canonical form, the process described in this section <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be used to ensure that information elements are unique with respect to one another and sorted in ascending order.
              Certification Authorities <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> anticipate that future Relying Parties will impose a strict requirement for the ipAddrBlocks field to be in this canonical form.
              This canonicalization procedure builds upon the canonicalization procedure specified in <xref target="RFC3779" section="2.2.3.6" sectionFormat="of" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3779#section-2.2.3.6" derivedContent="RFC3779"/>.
          </t>
          <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3.3-2">
              In order to semantically compare, sort, and deduplicate the contents of the ipAddrBlocks field, each ROAIPAddress element is mapped to an abstract data element composed of four integer values:
          </t>
          <dl indent="3" newline="false" spacing="normal" pn="section-4.3.3-3">
            <dt pn="section-4.3.3-3.1">afi</dt>
            <dd pn="section-4.3.3-3.2">The AFI value appearing in the addressFamily field of the containing ROAIPAddressFamily as an integer.</dd>
            <dt pn="section-4.3.3-3.3">addr</dt>
            <dd pn="section-4.3.3-3.4">The first IP address of the IP prefix appearing in the ROAIPAddress address field, as a 32-bit (IPv4) or 128-bit (IPv6) integer value.</dd>
            <dt pn="section-4.3.3-3.5">plen</dt>
            <dd pn="section-4.3.3-3.6">The length of the IP prefix appearing in the ROAIPAddress address field as an integer value.</dd>
            <dt pn="section-4.3.3-3.7">mlen</dt>
            <dd pn="section-4.3.3-3.8">The value appearing in the maxLength field of the ROAIPAddress element, if present; otherwise, the above prefix length value.</dd>
          </dl>
          <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3.3-4">
              Thus, the equality or relative order of two ROAIPAddress elements can be tested by comparing their abstract representations.
          </t>
          <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-4.3.3.1">
            <name slugifiedName="name-comparator">Comparator</name>
            <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3.3.1-1">
                The set of ipAddrBlocks is totally ordered.
                The order of two ipAddrBlocks is determined by the first non-equal comparison in the following list.
            </t>
            <ol indent="adaptive" spacing="normal" start="1" type="1" pn="section-4.3.3.1-2">
                <li pn="section-4.3.3.1-2.1" derivedCounter="1.">
                  Data elements with a lower afi value precede data elements with a higher afi value.
                </li>
              <li pn="section-4.3.3.1-2.2" derivedCounter="2.">
                  Data elements with a lower addr value precede data elements with a higher addr value.
                </li>
              <li pn="section-4.3.3.1-2.3" derivedCounter="3.">
                  Data elements with a lower plen value precede data elements with a higher plen value.
                </li>
              <li pn="section-4.3.3.1-2.4" derivedCounter="4.">
                  Data elements with a lower mlen value precede data elements with a higher mlen value.
                </li>
            </ol>
            <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3.3.1-3">
                Data elements for which all four values compare equal are duplicates of one another.
            </t>
          </section>
          <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-4.3.3.2">
            <name slugifiedName="name-example-implementations">Example Implementations</name>
            <ul bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" spacing="normal" pn="section-4.3.3.2-1">
              <li pn="section-4.3.3.2-1.1">A sorting implementation <xref target="roasort-c" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="roasort-c"/> in ISO/IEC 9899:1999 ("ANSI C99").</li>
              <li pn="section-4.3.3.2-1.2">A sorting implementation <xref target="roasort-rs" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="roasort-rs"/> in the Rust 2021 Edition.</li>
            </ul>
          </section>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-5">
      <name slugifiedName="name-roa-validation">ROA Validation</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-1">
          Before a Relying Party can use a ROA to validate a routing announcement, the Relying Party <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> first validate the ROA.
          To validate a ROA, the Relying Party <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> perform all the validation checks specified in <xref target="RFC6488" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6488"/> as well as the following additional ROA-specific validation steps:
      </t>
      <ul bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" spacing="normal" pn="section-5-2">
        <li pn="section-5-2.1">
            The IP address delegation extension <xref target="RFC3779" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3779"/> is present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ROA), and every IP address prefix in the ROA payload is contained within the set of IP addresses specified by the EE certificate's IP address delegation extension.
          </li>
        <li pn="section-5-2.2">
            The EE certificate's IP address delegation extension <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain "inherit" elements as described in <xref target="RFC3779" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3779"/>.
          </li>
        <li pn="section-5-2.3">
            The Autonomous System identifier delegation extension described in <xref target="RFC3779" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3779"/> is not used in ROAs and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be present in the EE certificate.
          </li>
        <li pn="section-5-2.4">
            The ROA content fully conforms with all requirements specified in
Sections <xref target="content" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="3"/> and <xref target="econtent" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="4"/>.
          </li>
      </ul>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-3">
          If any of the above checks fail, the ROA in its entirety <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be considered invalid and an error <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be logged.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-6">
      <name slugifiedName="name-security-considerations">Security Considerations</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-6-1">
        There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA; it is anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users.
        There is no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication.
        Although the ROA is a signed, application-layer object, there is no intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-6-2">
        The purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to originate a route to the prefix or prefixes in the ROA.
        Thus, the integrity of a ROA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be established.
        This ROA specification makes use of the RPKI signed object format; thus, all security considerations discussed in <xref target="RFC6488" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6488"/> also apply to ROAs.
Additionally, the signed object profile uses the CMS signed message format for integrity; thus, ROAs inherit all security considerations associated with that data structure.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-6-3">
        The right of the ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate routes to the prefix or prefixes is established through the use of the address space and AS number PKI as described in <xref target="RFC6480" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6480"/>.
        Specifically, one <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify the signature on the ROA using an X.509 certificate issued under this PKI and check that the prefix or prefixes in the ROA are contained within those in the certificate's IP address delegation extension.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-7">
      <name slugifiedName="name-iana-considerations">IANA Considerations</name>
      <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-7.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-smi-security-for-s-mime-cms">SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-7.1-1">
          IANA has updated the id-ct-routeOriginAuthz entry in the "SMI Security for S⁠/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows:
        </t>
        <table anchor="tab1" align="center" pn="table-1">
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Decimal</th>
              <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Description</th>
              <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">References</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">24</td>
              <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">id-ct-routeOriginAuthz</td>
              <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">RFC 9582</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
      <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-7.2">
        <name slugifiedName="name-rpki-signed-objects-registr">RPKI Signed Objects Registry</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-1">
          IANA has updated the Route Origination Authorization entry in the "RPKI Signed Objects" registry created by <xref target="RFC6488" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6488"/> as follows:
        </t>
        <table anchor="tab-2" align="center" pn="table-2">
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Name</th>
              <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">OID</th>
              <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Route Origination Authorization</td>
              <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24</td>
              <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">RFC 9582</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
      <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-7.3">
        <name slugifiedName="name-file-extension">File Extension</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-7.3-1">
          IANA has updated the entry for the ROA file extension in the "RPKI Repository Name Schemes" registry created by <xref target="RFC6481" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6481"/> as follows:
        </t>
        <table anchor="tab3" align="center" pn="table-3">
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Filename Extension</th>
              <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">RPKI Object</th>
              <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">.roa</td>
              <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Route Origination Authorization</td>
              <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">RFC 9582</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
      <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-7.4">
        <name slugifiedName="name-smi-security-for-s-mime-mod">SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-7.4-1">
          IANA has allocated the following entry in the "SMI Security for S⁠/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry:
        </t>
        <table anchor="tab4" align="center" pn="table-4">
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Decimal</th>
              <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Description</th>
              <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">References</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">75</td>
              <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">id-mod-rpkiROA-2023</td>
              <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">RFC 9582</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
      <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-7.5">
        <name slugifiedName="name-media-type">Media Type</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-7.5-1">
          IANA has updated the media type application/rpki-roa in the "Media Types" registry as follows:
        </t>
        <dl spacing="normal" newline="false" indent="3" pn="section-7.5-2">
          <dt pn="section-7.5-2.1">Type name:</dt>
          <dd pn="section-7.5-2.2">application</dd>
          <dt pn="section-7.5-2.3">Subtype name:</dt>
          <dd pn="section-7.5-2.4">rpki-roa</dd>
          <dt pn="section-7.5-2.5">Required parameters:</dt>
          <dd pn="section-7.5-2.6">N/A</dd>
          <dt pn="section-7.5-2.7">Optional parameters:</dt>
          <dd pn="section-7.5-2.8">N/A</dd>
          <dt pn="section-7.5-2.9">Encoding considerations:</dt>
          <dd pn="section-7.5-2.10">binary</dd>
          <dt pn="section-7.5-2.11">Security considerations:</dt>
          <dd pn="section-7.5-2.12">Carries an RPKI ROA (RFC 9582).
       This media type contains no active content. See
       Section 6 of RFC 9582 for further information.</dd>
          <dt pn="section-7.5-2.13">Interoperability considerations:</dt>
          <dd pn="section-7.5-2.14">None</dd>
          <dt pn="section-7.5-2.15">Published specification:</dt>
          <dd pn="section-7.5-2.16">RFC 9582</dd>
          <dt pn="section-7.5-2.17">Applications that use this media type:</dt>
          <dd pn="section-7.5-2.18">RPKI operators</dd>
          <dt pn="section-7.5-2.19">Additional information:</dt>
          <dd pn="section-7.5-2.20">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-7.5-2.20.1"><br/></t>
            <dl spacing="compact" indent="3" newline="false" pn="section-7.5-2.20.2">
              <dt pn="section-7.5-2.20.2.1">Content:</dt>
              <dd pn="section-7.5-2.20.2.2">This media type is a signed object, as defined
         in <xref target="RFC6488" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6488"/>, which contains a payload of a list of
         prefixes and an AS identifier as defined in RFC 9582.</dd>
              <dt pn="section-7.5-2.20.2.3">Magic number(s):</dt>
              <dd pn="section-7.5-2.20.2.4">None</dd>
              <dt pn="section-7.5-2.20.2.5">File extension(s):</dt>
              <dd pn="section-7.5-2.20.2.6">.roa</dd>
              <dt pn="section-7.5-2.20.2.7">Macintosh file type code(s):</dt>
              <dd pn="section-7.5-2.20.2.8">None</dd>
            </dl>
          </dd>
          <dt pn="section-7.5-2.21">Person &amp; email address to contact for further information:</dt>
          <dd pn="section-7.5-2.22">
            <br/>Job Snijders &lt;job@fastly.com&gt;</dd>
          <dt pn="section-7.5-2.23">Intended usage:</dt>
          <dd pn="section-7.5-2.24">COMMON</dd>
          <dt pn="section-7.5-2.25">Restrictions on usage:</dt>
          <dd pn="section-7.5-2.26">None</dd>
          <dt pn="section-7.5-2.27">Change controller:</dt>
          <dd pn="section-7.5-2.28">IETF</dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references pn="section-8">
      <name slugifiedName="name-references">References</name>
      <references pn="section-8.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-normative-references">Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3779" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC3779">
          <front>
            <title>X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers</title>
            <author fullname="C. Lynn" initials="C." surname="Lynn"/>
            <author fullname="S. Kent" initials="S." surname="Kent"/>
            <author fullname="K. Seo" initials="K." surname="Seo"/>
            <date month="June" year="2004"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document defines two X.509 v3 certificate extensions. The first binds a list of IP address blocks, or prefixes, to the subject of a certificate. The second binds a list of autonomous system identifiers to the subject of a certificate. These extensions may be used to convey the authorization of the subject to use the IP addresses and autonomous system identifiers contained in the extensions. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3779"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3779"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4291" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4291">
          <front>
            <title>IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="R. Hinden" initials="R." surname="Hinden"/>
            <author fullname="S. Deering" initials="S." surname="Deering"/>
            <date month="February" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This specification defines the addressing architecture of the IP Version 6 (IPv6) protocol. The document includes the IPv6 addressing model, text representations of IPv6 addresses, definition of IPv6 unicast addresses, anycast addresses, and multicast addresses, and an IPv6 node's required addresses.</t>
              <t indent="0">This document obsoletes RFC 3513, "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture". [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4291"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4291"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5652" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5652">
          <front>
            <title>Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)</title>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <date month="September" year="2009"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document describes the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). This syntax is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message content. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="70"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5652"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5652"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6268" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6268">
          <front>
            <title>Additional New ASN.1 Modules for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)</title>
            <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
            <author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner"/>
            <date month="July" year="2011"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) format, and many associated formats, are expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to the 1988 version of ASN.1. This document updates some auxiliary ASN.1 modules to conform to the 2008 version of ASN.1; the 1988 ASN.1 modules remain the normative version. There are no bits- on-the-wire changes to any of the formats; this is simply a change to the syntax. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6268"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6268"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6481" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6481">
          <front>
            <title>A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure</title>
            <author fullname="G. Huston" initials="G." surname="Huston"/>
            <author fullname="R. Loomans" initials="R." surname="Loomans"/>
            <author fullname="G. Michaelson" initials="G." surname="Michaelson"/>
            <date month="February" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document defines a profile for the structure of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) distributed repository. Each individual repository publication point is a directory that contains files that correspond to X.509/PKIX Resource Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists and signed objects. This profile defines the object (file) naming scheme, the contents of repository publication points (directories), and a suggested internal structure of a local repository cache that is intended to facilitate synchronization across a distributed collection of repository publication points and to facilitate certification path construction. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6481"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6481"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6482" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6482">
          <front>
            <title>A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Lepinski" initials="M." surname="Lepinski"/>
            <author fullname="S. Kent" initials="S." surname="Kent"/>
            <author fullname="D. Kong" initials="D." surname="Kong"/>
            <date month="February" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6482"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6482"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6487" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6487">
          <front>
            <title>A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates</title>
            <author fullname="G. Huston" initials="G." surname="Huston"/>
            <author fullname="G. Michaelson" initials="G." surname="Michaelson"/>
            <author fullname="R. Loomans" initials="R." surname="Loomans"/>
            <date month="February" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for the purpose of supporting validation of assertions of "right-of-use" of Internet Number Resources (INRs). The certificates issued under this profile are used to convey the issuer's authorization of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-use" of the INRs that are described in the certificate. This document contains the normative specification of Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) syntax in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). This document also specifies profiles for the format of certificate requests and specifies the Relying Party RPKI certificate path validation procedure. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6487"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6487"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6488" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6488">
          <front>
            <title>Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Lepinski" initials="M." surname="Lepinski"/>
            <author fullname="A. Chi" initials="A." surname="Chi"/>
            <author fullname="S. Kent" initials="S." surname="Kent"/>
            <date month="February" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document defines a generic profile for signed objects used in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). These RPKI signed objects make use of Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as a standard encapsulation format. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6488"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6488"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="X.690" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="X.690">
          <front>
            <title>Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)</title>
            <author>
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">ITU-T</organization>
            </author>
            <date month="February" year="2021"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="X.690"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references pn="section-8.2">
        <name slugifiedName="name-informative-references">Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC4648" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4648">
          <front>
            <title>The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</title>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <date month="October" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4648"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4648"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5280" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5280">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
            <author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper"/>
            <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/>
            <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
            <author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen"/>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/>
            <date month="May" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6480" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6480">
          <front>
            <title>An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing</title>
            <author fullname="M. Lepinski" initials="M." surname="Lepinski"/>
            <author fullname="S. Kent" initials="S." surname="Kent"/>
            <date month="February" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document describes an architecture for an infrastructure to support improved security of Internet routing. The foundation of this architecture is a Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) that represents the allocation hierarchy of IP address space and Autonomous System (AS) numbers; and a distributed repository system for storing and disseminating the data objects that comprise the RPKI, as well as other signed objects necessary for improved routing security. As an initial application of this architecture, the document describes how a legitimate holder of IP address space can explicitly and verifiably authorize one or more ASes to originate routes to that address space. Such verifiable authorizations could be used, for example, to more securely construct BGP route filters. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6480"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6480"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9319" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9319" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC9319">
          <front>
            <title>The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)</title>
            <author fullname="Y. Gilad" initials="Y." surname="Gilad"/>
            <author fullname="S. Goldberg" initials="S." surname="Goldberg"/>
            <author fullname="K. Sriram" initials="K." surname="Sriram"/>
            <author fullname="J. Snijders" initials="J." surname="Snijders"/>
            <author fullname="B. Maddison" initials="B." surname="Maddison"/>
            <date month="October" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document recommends ways to reduce the forged-origin hijack attack surface by prudently limiting the set of IP prefixes that are included in a Route Origin Authorization (ROA). One recommendation is to avoid using the maxLength attribute in ROAs except in some specific cases. The recommendations complement and extend those in RFC 7115. This document also discusses the creation of ROAs for facilitating the use of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) mitigation services. Considerations related to ROAs and RPKI-based Route Origin Validation (RPKI-ROV) in the context of destination-based Remotely Triggered Discard Route (RTDR) (elsewhere referred to as "Remotely Triggered Black Hole") filtering are also highlighted.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="185"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9319"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9319"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="roasort-c" target="https://github.com/job/roasort" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="roasort-c">
          <front>
            <title>ROA sorter in C</title>
            <author fullname="Job Snijders"/>
            <date month="July" year="2023"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>commit 68969ea</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="roasort-rs" target="https://github.com/benmaddison/roasort" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="roasort-rs">
          <front>
            <title>ROA sorter in Rust</title>
            <author fullname="Ben Maddison"/>
            <date month="August" year="2023"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>commit 023e756</refcontent>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <section anchor="example" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.a">
      <name slugifiedName="name-example-roa-econtent-payloa">Example ROA eContent Payload</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-1">
        An example of a DER-encoded ROA eContent is provided below, with annotation following the "#" character.
      </t>
      <sourcecode markers="false" pn="section-appendix.a-2">

$ echo 16i 301802030100003011300F040200023009300703050020010DB8 P \
  | dc | openssl asn1parse -inform DER -i -dump
 0:d=0  hl=2 l=  24 cons: SEQUENCE           # RouteOriginAttestation
 2:d=1  hl=2 l=   3 prim:  INTEGER  :010000  #  asID 65536
 7:d=1  hl=2 l=  17 cons:  SEQUENCE          #  ipAddrBlocks
 9:d=2  hl=2 l=  15 cons:   SEQUENCE         #   ROAIPAddressFamily
11:d=3  hl=2 l=   2 prim:    OCTET STRING    #    addressFamily
   0000 - 00 02                              #     IPv6
15:d=3  hl=2 l=   9 cons:    SEQUENCE        #    addresses
17:d=4  hl=2 l=   7 cons:     SEQUENCE       #     ROAIPAddress
19:d=5  hl=2 l=   5 prim:      BIT STRING    #      2001:db8::/32
    0000 - 00 20 01 0d b8
</sourcecode>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-3">
        Below is a complete RPKI ROA signed object, <xref target="RFC4648" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4648">Base64 encoded per</xref>.
      </t>
      <sourcecode anchor="object" markers="false" pn="section-appendix.a-4">
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</sourcecode>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-5">
        The object in this appendix has the following properties:
      </t>
      <sourcecode markers="false" pn="section-appendix.a-6">

Object size: 1668 octets
Object SHA256 message digest:
     3a39e0b652e79ddf6efdd178ad5e3b29e0121b1e593b89f1e0ac18f3ba60d5e7

CMS signing time: Wed 01 May 2024 00:34:13 +0000

X.509 end-entity certificate
Subject key id: DE145B193FB320B25A744355298C8BF7C2523D22
Authority key id: D67208EA470E9D6DD6654022F553ADC1389AB434
Issuer: CN=86525cd5-44d7-4df9-8079-4a9dcdf26944
Serial: 3
Not before: Wed 01 May 2024 00:34:13 +0000
Not after: Thu 01 May 2025 00:34:13 +0000
IP address delegation: 2001:db8::/32

ROA eContent
asID: 65536
addresses: 2001:db8::/32
</sourcecode>
    </section>
    <section anchor="acknowledgements" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.b">
      <name slugifiedName="name-acknowledgements">Acknowledgements</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.b-1">
        The authors wish to thank <contact fullname="Theo Buehler"/>, <contact fullname="Ties de Kock"/>, <contact fullname="Martin Hoffmann"/>, <contact fullname="Charles Gardiner"/>, <contact fullname="Russ Housley"/>, <contact fullname="Jeffrey Haas"/>, <contact fullname="Bob Beck"/>, and <contact fullname="Tom Harrison"/> for their help and contributions.
        Additionally, the authors thank <contact fullname="Jim Fenton"/>, <contact fullname="Vijay Gurbani"/>, <contact fullname="Haoyu Song"/>, <contact fullname="Rob Austein"/>, <contact fullname="Roque Gagliano"/>, <contact fullname="Danny McPherson"/>, <contact fullname="Sam Weiler"/>, <contact fullname="Jasdip Singh"/>, and <contact fullname="Murray S. Kucherawy"/> for their careful reviews and helpful comments.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="authors-addresses" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.c">
      <name slugifiedName="name-authors-addresses">Authors' Addresses</name>
      <author fullname="Job Snijders" initials="J." surname="Snijders">
        <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Fastly</organization>
        <address>
          <postal>
            <postalLine>Amsterdam</postalLine>
            <postalLine>The Netherlands</postalLine>
          </postal>
          <email>job@fastly.com</email>
        </address>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Ben Maddison" initials="B" surname="Maddison">
        <organization abbrev="Workonline" showOnFrontPage="true">Workonline</organization>
        <address>
          <postal>
            <street/>
            <city>Cape Town</city>
            <country>South Africa</country>
          </postal>
          <email>benm@workonline.africa</email>
        </address>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Matthew Lepinski" initials="M." surname="Lepinski">
        <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Carleton College</organization>
        <address>
          <email>mlepinski@carleton.edu</email>
        </address>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Derrick Kong" initials="D." surname="Kong">
        <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Raytheon</organization>
        <address>
          <email>derrick.kong@raytheon.com</email>
        </address>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Stephen Kent" initials="S." surname="Kent">
        <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Independent</organization>
        <address>
          <email>kent@alum.mit.edu</email>
        </address>
      </author>
    </section>
  </back>
</rfc>
